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Economists have long been aware that “the consumer is no longer an expert 
shopper. More and more, therefore, the consumer of today has to judge quality by 
some indices of quality. Hence the importance producers attach to goodwill and 
trademarks. Another important index of quality is price” (Scitovsky, 1944-5, p. 100). 
That is, at the time of purchase consumers observe intrinsic and extrinsic quality 
signals rather than experiencing the actual quality attributes (Steenkamp, 1990). 
This is especially true for services and some products, such as wine, which cannot 
be judged until actual consumption occurs. 
 
Akerlof (1970) deduced some of the consequences of formally injecting into economic 
thought the notion that consumers often make purchasing decisions under 
uncertainty as to product quality. Subsequently, the implied ideas that “prices 
convey information other than that about scarcity” and that economically relevant 
information is conveyed in a variety of ways were also formalized (Stiglitz, 2000, p. 
1449). Even in Scitovsky’s time, however, the basic ideas were not novel. Rather, 
they had fallen between cracks that remained unfilled in microeconomic models 
built on a shaky foundation of a world populated by economic agents that had 
perfect information (Stiglitz, 2002). The burgeoning field of information economics 
allows that foundation to crumble, replacing it with one that incorporates 
ubiquitous and imperfect, but economically relevant, information that influences 
behavior.  
 
Akerlof drew attention to the information asymmetries about product quality that 
might exist between buyers and sellers and suggested that “[N]umerous institutions 
would arise to counteract the effects of quality uncertainty” (Akerlof, 1970, p. 499). 
He cited guarantees and various types of branding as cases in point. Spence paid 
heed. After initially being intrigued by the potential implications of asymmetric 
information for job markets, he turned his attention to the implications of what he 
called information-conveying signals for market structure in general (Spence, 2002, 
p. 434). The signals might extend beyond those over which sellers have control and 
intentionally send to buyers (i.e., advertisements) or that buyers may infer from 
seller behavior (i.e., money-back guarantees), and include such things as buyer 
experience and third-party sources (Spence, 1977, p. 571).  
 
The information conveyed through signals may impact the behavior of a market’s 
agents, and their individual actions, and in turn may provide additional information 
to the other participants (Stiglitz, 2000. p. 1469). It therefore becomes incumbent 
upon sellers to know how buyers will interpret the signals they are being sent. For 
their part, buyers seek to separate the wheat from the chaff so as to take full 
advantage of those same signals in their own decision-making processes.  
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Although various quality signals, cues, or indicators have attracted considerable 
theoretical attention, the empirical evidence as to their quality is scarce and mixed 
(Kirmani and Rao, 2000). Gerstner (1985), for example, found higher prices to be 
poor signals of quality, and Hjorth-Anderson (1991) gave low marks to both price 
and seller reputation as quality indicators. By contrast, examining warranties for 
appliances and motor vehicles Wiener (1985) found them to be accurate quality 
(reliability) indicators. Kirmani and Rao (2000) conclude that from the perspective 
of a seller attempting to influence buyer behavior, sending a combination of 
complementary quality signals would be the most apt signaling strategy.  
 
Horowitz and Lockshin (2002) sought to contribute to the latter literature. There, a 
quality measure for eight varieties of Australian wine serves as the dependent 
variable in linear regressions whose independent variables are many of the signals 
that others have used to explain wine quality. We now extend this earlier work to 
address two additional quality-related issues: (1) Will a producer who gives more or 
less bang for the Australian buck in a bottle of any one varietal on a retailer’s shelf 
tend to do likewise in its other offerings? (2) Does the number of varietals that a 
producer offers signal anything about the bang for the buck provided by any one of 
them? Thus, whereas Oczkowski (2001) considers a bargain wine to be one that sells 
for a lower-than-expected price, given its quality, we look at the flip side of the coin 
and consider a bargain wine to be one that provides greater-than-expected quality 
for the price at which it sells. We call this a quality-bargain. This is a relevant issue 
for many product categories, including the wine sector. Quality improvements occur 
constantly in consumer products, while the price points remain constant. This has 
occurred in automobiles in regard to safety, reliability, and fuel consumption as well 
as in the wine industry. With wine, however, the quality-bargain issue is especially 
salient. Even knowledgeable consumers shopping for wine will often seek the 
counsel of a shop’s wine expert. After eliciting some information as to the customer’s 
preferences and/or what occasions the purchase, the expert will typically ask a 
question along the following lines: “What price range did you have in mind?” The 
expert’s recommendations will then reflect his or her judgment as to the highest-
quality wines – the quality-bargains – within that price range. We then ask (1) 
whether producers are prone to providing either quality-bargains or rip-offs across 
the entire range of their offerings, and (2) whether product diversity is a useful 
signal of a producer’s tendency to do either. The answer to the first question is a 
soft-spoken “Yes” with respect to a few varieties, such as riesling when paired with 
shiraz, and a much louder “No” with respect to most other pairings, such as 
chardonnay and sauvignon blanc. The answer to the second question is a firm “Yes,” 
with the tendency being to give less bang for the buck when more than two varieties 
of wine are on offer.  
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The Diversity Issue  
 
Approximately 2000 wineries comprise the Australian wine industry. Some grow 
their own grapes and make, bottle and sell their own branded wine; others sell wine 
that is made elsewhere or wine produced from purchased grapes (Kyte-Powell and 
Hooke, 2000, p. 5). The three largest producers, Foster’s Wine Estates (comprising 
Beringer-Blass and Southcorp Wines), Hardy Wines (part of Constellation Brands), 
and Orlando-Wyndham are groups that account for more than seventy-five percent 
of the industry’s wine-grape crush. That crush has grown by almost fifty percent 
over the past five years and now exceeds 1.8 million tons. Over 50 percent of the 
wine produced from that crush, in excess of 500 million liters valued at over 2.2 
billion Australian dollars ($) is exported. Almost half of those exports, and one-third 
of the production of the Big Three, go to the United Kingdom; another quarter goes 
to the United States (AWBC, 2003). The year 2000 was a hallmark year for the 
industry, one in which for the first, but surely not the last time Australia was the 
largest exporter of New World wine (Nicholson, 2001, p. 40). 
 
One of the reasons the wine sector in Australia provides a useful test arena is due to 
the diversity of the product offer available. The standard supermarket category has 
between 3-10 brands and around 50-70 product variants. The wine category itself 
has a minimum of 300 brands and product variants, which stretches to over 1500 
different wines in some more specialized outlets. All groups bottle wine under labels 
that are designed to appeal to all tastes and budgets. Foster’s Wine Estates, for 
example, sells in the neighborhood of ten million cases of its Lindemans’ Bin 95 
Sauvignon Blanc, Bin 65 Chardonnay, Bin 99 Pinot Noir, Bin 50 Shiraz, and Bin 45 
Cabernet Sauvignon, all of which retail for at most $10 a bottle; Foster’s Wine 
Estates sells somewhat less of its Penfolds’ Grange, the Australian pride and joy, a 
shiraz that retails for about $300 (Halliday, 2001, pp. 216-17, 287). By contrast, the 
Scarp Valley Vineyard produced only 24 cases of its sole label, Scarp Valley Darling 
Range Hermitage, a shiraz and cabernet sauvignon blend that retails for about $17, 
while Jollymont, perhaps Australia’s smallest winery, produced 20 cases in total of 
a pinot noir and a chardonnay that retail in the $20-$25 range (Halliday, 2001, pp. 
185, 341).  
 
Looking down from the heavens, Adam Smith who believed that the division of 
labour “must always be limited by…the extent of the market” (Smith, 1776, pp. 1-
21) might well be surprised at the variety of products offered by the multi-product 
firm that characterizes the Australian wine industry. Two centuries later and long 
after the multi-product firm became a global phenomenon, economies of scope was 
formalized into a commonly accepted concept in the economics literature, one that 
provides the multi-product firm with a raison d’être (Panzar and Willig, 1981, p. 
168). Thus, like Rosen’s suppliers, Australian wineries “either specialize their 
production in distinct varieties or produce several of them in a product line. Costs 
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competitors’ costs factor into these outcomes” (Rosen, 2002, p. 4), and firm size does 
not necessarily dictate the course of action taken by any one of them. Nonetheless, a 
small winery is more likely to concentrate its efforts on a few wines, whereas a 
larger winery or group is more likely to diversify its offerings. This raises two 
issues, the first being whether size signals quality. Is the mystique of the boutique 
winery justified? Has a large group gained market share at the expense of quality? 
We touched on these interesting questions in our earlier paper. A second issue is 
whether the diversity of a seller’s product line reveals anything about whether those 
products are or are not quality-bargains. Do you get your money’s worth when you 
buy one of the two varietals that are sold by a boutique winery? Quality 
considerations aside, do any economies of scope enjoyed by a large group translate 
into better wine for the money? In this paper, then, we explore whether product 
diversity signals quality-bargains in Australian wine. 
 
Estimating Deviations from Quality Expectations for an Australian Wine 
 
Horowitz and Lockshin (2002) hypothesized that an Australian winery’s reputation 
and the price of any one bottle are effective, if imperfect, quality signals. Like brand 
advertising, price is an extrinsic attribute that consumers often use to assess 
product quality when the intrinsic attributes cannot be assessed (Ralston, 2003). 
The bottle’s label typically contains additional potentially cogent information, with 
the location of the winery as a signal of its collective reputation (Landon and Smith, 
1998, p. 632), and the vintage, being particular cases in point. Indeed, it is a poorly-
kept secret that, in general, region of origin has the potential to influence consumer 
perceptions of a product and consequently the price consumers are willing to pay for 
it (Quagrainie et al., 2003), and wine is often offered as a classic case in point (e..g, 
van Ittersum et al., 2003, p. 215).  
 
Consumer expectations may also be influenced by expert judgments, even though 
the latter are necessarily subjective and are also imperfect predictors of quality 
because, for example, “experts do not take into account all the information that they 
have…Ratings of wine experts do not predict in an efficient way the prices of 
mature Bordeaux wines for the same reasons’ (Ginsburgh, 2003, p. 110). Still, wine 
producers hope their better efforts will be rewarded at wine exhibitions, say, in that 
they can subsequently mention of any notable awards a wine may have received as 
an addendum to the bottle’s label (Orth and Krška, 2001). 
 
From that jumping-off point, and with a wine-quality measure as the dependent 
variable and eight potential quality signals as the independent variables, Horowitz 
and Lockshin (2002) estimated individual linear regressions for eight varietals of 
wine, four whites and four reds: chardonnay, riesling, sauvignon blanc, and 
semillon are the whites, and cabernet sauvignon, merlot, pinot noir, and shiraz are 
the reds. Blends such as Fox Creek’s JSM (shiraz 70%, cabernet franc 20%, and 
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problems. The more familiar sort of analysis uses similar cues and a quality 
measure to explain price in a hedonic price equation as in Combris et al. (1997, 
2000), Landis and Smith (1997, 1998), and Ocskowski (1994, 2001). Unwin (1999) 
provides an excellent review of hedonic wine-price models. Insofar as price and 
quality are variables that are jointly determined by management and the market, 
explaining the two-way price-quantity relationship would require a simultaneous-
equation model, such as the one used by Ling and Lockshin (2003). Our more 
modest aspirations were to focus solely on how individual consumers might use the 
available extrinsic cues on the price tag and label affixed to the bottle, in an 
attempt to glean some insights into a wine’s intrinsic quality. In a sense, we are 
estimating what might be termed a hedonic quality regression, the flip side of the 
hedonic-price-regression coin (Rosen, 1974), wherein buyers shop around and 
compare the qualities of brands with different bundles of characteristics, including 
price. If, to modestly paraphrase Rosen (1974, p. 37), two brands offer the same 
bundle, but promise different qualities, consumers only consider the higher-quality 
one, and the identity of the sellers is irrelevant to their purchase decision. This is 
not a bargaining process in which the consumer and the producer negotiate 
themselves into a price-quality equilibrium. Rather, the consumer looks at the 
bottle and the price in a take-it-or leave-it situation and decides, based on his or her 
expectations as to the quality of the bottle’s contents, whether the wine is going to 
be worth its cost. 
 
The quality measure is the well-known and highly respected Halliday (1999) wine 
ratings, denoted H1. Halliday’s ratings generally run from the mid 70s to the high 
90s, and are always expressed as integers; the lowest-quality wines are not rated. 
Although this means that many of the very lowest-priced wines are not included in 
our database, the database does include a large number of low-priced wines and 
does indeed cover the full price range. Unfortunately it also means that any higher-
priced wines that did not meet Halliday’s minimum standards are also excluded.  
 
Assuredly, any quality measure is open to dispute and prone to measurement error 
(Landon and Smith, 1997; Schamel and Anderson, 2001; Oczkowski, 2001). 
Oczkowski (2001, pp. 315-317), in particular, observes, that quality-measurement 
error can result in biased ordinary-least-squares (OLS) parameter estimates, which 
is the case when the measure is an independent variable in a hedonic price 
equation. When, however, when the quality measure is the dependent variable, 
even with measurement error OLS will give unbiased parameter estimates. The 
penalty paid for measurement error is less precision, in the sense of overestimated 
standard errors and an underestimated coefficient of determination (R2) (Hausman, 
2001, pp. 59-60). But James Halliday’s authoritative book on Australian wines has 
been published annually for more than a decade, and he has contributed to the wine 
literature on a regular basis for more than two decades. When Halliday speaks, 
albeit with a not completely infallible voice, the Australian wine industry and its 
customers listen. We do too. Horowitz and Lockshin / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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The Halliday rating system has a particular virtue for the use to which it is put 
here: namely, it provides metric ratings that can serve as the dependent variable in 
an ordinary-least-squares regression, as opposed to count data, qualitative data, 
rankings, or categorizations, all of which would imply the need to use some discrete-
choice estimation approach, such as multivariate logit (Greene, 2003, pp. 663-664). 
That is, unlike a system that might award stars to wines, for example, where the 
implied quality difference between a one-star wine and a two-star wine is not 
necessarily the same as that between a four-star wine and a five-star wine. A 
Halliday two-point difference between wines has the same implication whether the 
wines are modest bottles in the 70s or higher-quality wines in the high 80s. 
 
Eight basic types of independent variables serve as our quality signals. Each 
winery’s individual reputation, as opposed to a group’s collective reputation, is 
measured here through Halliday’s winery rating, denoted H2. The ratings run from 
3 to 5 in half-point increments. Wineries not rated by Halliday were arbitrarily 
assigned a rating of 2.5. A winery’s reputation depends on its past output. The 
collective reputation of a group will depend upon some average of the reputations of 
its individual wineries (Tirole, 1996). Landis and Smith (1998) include three 
different collective reputation measures along with individual firm reputation in 
their hedonic price equation. Many if not most of our wineries are not members of a 
group and their collective and individual reputations would be one and the same. 
Insofar as high-quality wines command price premiums, the latter can be viewed as 
in part reflecting returns to the individual winery’s reputation (Shapiro, 1983). 
 
Price as a quality signal enters in three different ways. First, the natural logarithm 
of the retail price, denoted PNL, is included in every equation. Second a vector of 
dummy variables, denoted Pi, is introduced to reflect the so-called pricing points 
into which a particular bottle falls. The specific pricing points depend upon the 
varietal. Semillon and sauvignon blanc, for example, tend to sell for less than 
comparably-rated chardonnays. Thus, the pricing points considered for the former 
two wines are P ≤ 10, 10.01 ≤ P ≤ 15, 15.01 ≤ P ≤ 20, and P ≥ 20.01 and the vector Pi 
contains three dummy variables, one for each of the first three pricing categories. 
For chardonnay, however, two different pricing categories define dummy variables 
to replace the P ≥ 20.01 category: namely, 20.01 ≤ P ≤ 30 and P ≥ 30.01. Finally, we 
capture any interaction effects of price within each price category through a vector 
of variables denoted PNL× Pi. 
 
The winery’s experience and potential exposure to the public eye is captured in the 
dummy variable Y = 1 for a winery established after 1990 and Y = 0, otherwise. 
This variable, too, may reflect an individual winery’s reputation.  
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A vector of dummy variables, denoted Vj, distinguishes vintage. Depending upon the 
varietal, dummy variables were defined for either pre-1996 or pre-1997 vintages, as 
well as for each of the subsequent years.  
 
Winery or group size, which again may be at least a partial determinant of 
reputation, is another quality signal that was explored through a vector of dummy 
variables, denoted Q, defined in accordance with the total tons of grapes processed, 
or Q. Four size categories were delineated: namely, Q ≤ 99, 100 ≤ Q ≤ 999, 1,000 ≤ Q 
≤ 9,999, and Q ≥ 10,000.   
 
Finally, the vector of dummy variables Rk indicates the wine-producing region in 
which the winery is located. The vector’s components depend upon the varietal, 
because some regions, such as the Barossa Valley and Coonawarra, are notable for 
their cabernet sauvignons and shirazes, whereas the Clare Valley, say, is more 
noted for its aromatic white wines. The zero-one regional delineations serve as 
collective reputation indicators.  
 
Let ε denote a random-error term with the usual normality properties and let βm 
denote a population parameter; βm denotes a vector of parameters. Suppressing 
subscripts that delineate specific wines, parameter estimates bm and bm were 
obtained for eight specifications of the following regression equation, corresponding 
to each of the eight varietals: 
 
H1 = β0 + β1H2 + β3PNL + β4Pi + β5PNLPi + β6Y + β7Vj + β8Q + β9Rk + ε.    (1)  
 
After eliminating the variables whose coefficients were not statistically significant 
(α ≤ 0.106), the adjusted R2s for the final estimated equations ranged from a low of 
0.188 for merlot and a sample size of N = 94 (with four statistically significant [α ≤ 
0.026] slope-parameter estimates) to a high of 0.472 for semillon and N = 213 (with 
nine statistically significant [α ≤ 0.028] slope-parameter estimates). The individual 
reputation signal was an important positive (0.974 ≤ b1 ≤ 2.602) and statistically 
significant (α ≤ 0.005) factor in all eight estimated equations. In one form or another 
price also was an important positive (b3 > 0 and/or b4 ≥ 0 and/or b5 ≥ 0) and statistically 
significant (α ≤ 0.008) factor in all eight estimated equations. The positive 
relationship, however, is not necessarily linear so that increases in price need not 
explain equal increases in quality. In only one case (merlot) was b6 = 2.949 
statistically significant (α = 0.015). At least one vintage dummy entered into each 
final equation, implying that some vintages signal lower-quality or higher-quality 
wines.  
 
The winery size dummies only entered into the final estimated equations for 
riesling, semillon, cabernet sauvignon, and pinot noir. Insofar as one can generalize 
this result, it would be to the effect that the largest wineries or groups tended to 
produce wines of these four varieties that are more highly rated than did the Horowitz and Lockshin / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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wineries or groups in one or more of the other size categories. Finally, one or more 
of the regional dummies, or collective reputation signals, entered into the final 
estimated equation for every varietal, in some cases with a positive impact and in 
others with a negative impact on the quality rating.  
 
In sum, then, as one might expect, price and winery rating are uniformly important 
and reliable quality signals across all varietals. Vintage, size of winery, and region 
can also provide cues as to the quality of an individual bottle for a particular 
varietal, but not necessarily for all varietals. The differences are in the details, 
which are available to the interested reader in Tables 2 and 3 of Horowitz and 
Lockshin (2002, pp. 14-15).  
 
We use the residual, 
 
e = H1 - b0 + b1H2 + b3PNL + b4Pi + b5PNLPi + b6Y + b7Vj + b8Q + b9Rk,   (2)  
 
as our ceteris paribus measure of the difference between the actual and the 
expected quality of a particular bottle of wine. To repeat, the question addressed 
here is not whether a particular winery or group offers consistently higher quality 
or lesser-quality wines. Rather, our concern is with whether the seller consistently 
offers higher quality or lesser-quality wines than the informed wine buyer has 
reason to expect, quality-bargains or rip-offs, given the seller’s various 
characteristics, including its reputation, and those of the particular bottle, including 
its price, and whether product diversity signals such. Assuredly, consumers willing 
to bear the costs of search can always pick up a copy of Halliday’s latest wine guide 
to inform themselves as to the quality of a particular bottle. Halliday, however, does 
not indicate whether the bottle is worth the price. Other guides or wine columnists, 
such as Kyte-Powell and Hooke (2000), indicate value for money, but their coverage 
is not as extensive as Halliday’s.  
 
Berrys Bridge (H2 = 4.50), for example, which is located in Pyrenees (R19 = 1), was 
established in 1990 (Y = 0). The winery was not included in our study, but it 
produced 1,500 cases of the only two wines that it sells during the study period: the 
1999 (V3 = 1) Berrys Bridge Shiraz (H1 = 89) and the 1999 Berrys Bridge Cabernet 
Sauvignon (H1 = 92). The 1,500 cases translate into Q < 35 (Q1 = 1). Both wines 
retail for P = $28, so that PNL = 3.3322, P7 = 1, and PNLP7 = 3.3322, and “[N]ot 
surprisingly, the limited quantity sells out with great speed” (Halliday, 2001, p. 33). 
That is, the winery produces a reasonably high-quality product. Halliday’s comment 
implies that both he and the public believe the wines to be more than reasonably 
priced, given their quality. In that sense they are quality-bargains. Focusing on the 
1999 Berrys Bridge Shiraz and substituting the above data into the estimated 
equation for shiraz, all the dummy variables for the statistically significant 
parameters are set equal to zero. The expected quality rating for this wine is: 
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E[H1] = 69.154 + 1.938×4.5 = 77.875. 
 
Thus the residual is: e = 89 – 77.875 = 11.125. As regards the 1999 Berrys Bridge 
Cabernet Sauvignon, here too all the dummy variables for the statistically 
significant parameter estimates are equal to zero and the expected quality rating is: 
 
  E[H1] = 62.741 + 1.951×4.5 = 71.521. 
 
The residual is: e = 92 – 71.521 = 20.479. Thus, as informed consumers we too are 
not surprised that Berrys Bridge wines sell out with alacrity. Berrys Bridge 1999 
vintage comprises two high-quality bottles that provide much more quality than its 
customers have reason to expect at that price. Both bottles are veritable bargains in 
this sense, too. 
 
The Overall Results 
 
Is Berrys Bridge unique among wineries specializing in cabernet sauvignon and 
shiraz in offering quality-bargains? Does Berrys Bridge do so as a matter of policy? 
There were 517 wineries or groups in our sample. Of those 517, disregarding any 
blends, 27 offered only shiraz and cabernet sauvignon. In some cases, however, 
more than one label of the varietal was on offer by the winery or group. The 
additional labels derive from, for example, different vintages of the same wine (e.g., 
1998 and 1999), different wines of the same vintage from the same winery (e.g., a 
1998 Shiraz and a 1998 Reserve Shiraz), and wines from different wineries in a 
group (e.g., a Coonawarra Shiraz and a Padthaway Shiraz). Averaging the residuals 
for each varietal, ten sellers other than Berrys Bridge exceeded the regression-
based quality expectations for both wines and six fell short for both. If deviations 
from the estimated regression line were strictly a matter of chance, in about half 
the cases we would find e ≤ 0, so that the likelihood of being either below or above 
the estimated regression line would be p = ½. Hence, the probability that a seller 
offering two varietals will have either e ≤ 0 or e ≥ 0 for both varietals, will be ¼. 
Therefore, an expected ¼×27 = 6.75 out of the 27 sellers would fall into each of the 
latter two categories. An expected 13.5 sellers, as opposed to 11 sellers, would be 
above the line for one varietal and below it for the other. Computing chi-square with 
two degrees of freedom yields χ
2 = 2.1111, and we fail to reject the independence and 
matter-of-chance hypothesis. Thus, the Berrys Bridge data might very well reflect 
the winery’s price and production policy and a management that considers itself to 
be in the wine-quality-bargain business. But nothing in the sample data suggests a 
quality-bargain or rip-off strategy in general for these 27 sellers, although the 
results for any one might reflect its quality vis-á-vis price and production policies. 
 
The average of the residuals is our ceteris paribus measure of the difference 
between the actual and the expected quality of a particular varietal offered by a 
winery or a group. The number of varietals is our measure of product diversity, Horowitz and Lockshin / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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although it captures only one dimension of product diversity. Other dimensions, 
such as the side-by-side appearance of the same varietal from different vineyards, 
or of different vintages, or by status (i.e., vintner’s reserve), are subsumed in the 
averaging process. 
 
To explore whether in general there is any relationship between the average 
residuals for one varietal and that for another, we first compute their 28 product-
moment correlation coefficients. If there is no tendency for a seller that bottles 
higher-than-might-be-expected quality of one varietal to bottle either higher-than-
might-be-expected or lower-than-might-be-expected quality of another, then each of 
these 28 coefficients should be equal to zero.  
 
The correlation coefficients are the above-the-diagonal elements of Table 1. The 
number of paired observations for the particular varietals is given below the 
diagonal. Thus, 66 sellers produced at least one label of both riesling and 
chardonnay. The correlation between the averages of the residuals of the labels for 
those 66 is 0.3162. Only 12 sellers produced at least one label of both pinot noir and 
merlot, and the correlation between the averages of the residuals of the labels for 
those 12 is –0.5240. The former correlation is statistically significant (α = 0.05), 
whereas the latter is not.  
 
Table 1: Number of Paired Varietals\Correlation Coefficients Between Residuals   
 Chard.  Riesling  Sau.  Bl.  Semillon  Merlot  Pin Noir  Cab. Sau.  Shiraz 
Chard -  0.3162*  0.0335  -0.1014 0.2493 0.1142 0.2612*  -0.0090 
Ries. 66  -  0.0831  -0.0540  -0.0199 0.1201 0.3372*  0.5474* 
Sau. Bl.  51  28  -  0.4463  -0.3750  0.0956  0.3095  0.1617 
Semillon  49  24  19  -  -0.0590 -0.2410 -0.0872 0.0440 
Merlot 35 19 18 17  -  -0.5240  0.0310  0.0631 
Pin.  Noir  84 40 32 14 12  -  -0.2330  0.1039 
Cab.  Sau.  90 51 36 44 28 30  -  0.2444* 
Shiraz  121  70 37 53 27 33  101 - 
* Statistically significant at α = 0.05. 
 
 
Six of the coefficients, all of which are positive, ranging between 0.2444 and 0.5474, 
are statistically significant. Cabernet sauvignon, paired with chardonnay, riesling, 
and shiraz, is one of the varietals in half of the statistically-significant 
relationships. In effect, there is the weak hint of a possible positive carry-over effect 
from one varietal to another, at least with regard to certain specific pairings of 
varietals. 
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A more illuminating result is obtained from our second set of computations and a 
chi-square analysis. Consider the 175 sellers that contributed only a single varietal 
to the sample set. Bellingham, for example, only produced riesling and Beresford 
only produced chardonnay. Of these 175 observations, 93 of the residual averages 
were positive and 82 were negative. Suppose specialization in a single varietal does 
not necessarily signal quality-bargain status. Instead, whether the specialist’s 
product is of higher or lesser quality than might be expected is likely a matter of 
chance. Then, half of the averages would be positive and half would be negative. 
Computing chi-square with one degree of freedom yields χ
2 = 0.6914, which does not 
reject the matter-of-chance hypothesis. Whether as a matter of policy some 
Australian wineries that specialize in a particular varietal provide higher or lesser 
quality than might be expected from its price and its label, is a separate issue. It 
would, however, be erroneous for the consumer to infer anything either positive or 
negative about whether a bottle of wine is a quality-bargain from the signal that it 
contains the only varietal that the winery offers. 
 
Table 2 extends this analysis to producers that contributed between two and four 
varietals to the sample set. With two varietals, χ
2 = 1.9938, which again does not 
reject the matter-of-chance hypothesis. With three varietals and three degrees of 
freedom, however, we get a statistically significant (α = 0.05) χ
2 = 6.0582. Four 
varietals and four degrees of freedom also yield in a statistically significant χ
2 = 
13.4493. The latter two tests reject the matter-of-chance hypothesis in favor of the 
suggestion that when sellers offer more than two varietals the bang for a buck 
offered in one of these will tend to be related to the bang for the buck offered in 
another. Closer inspection of the elements contributing to the chi-square suggests 
what that relationship might be.  
 
Table 2: Data For The Chi-Square Tests For One to Four Varietals    
No. Positive (+) and Negative (-)    Actual    Expected    χ2   
    +    93   87.5    0.3457 
One  Varietal  -    82   87.5    0.3457 
    Total    175   175    0.6914 
    ++    48   40.25    1.4927 
Two  Varietals  +-    75   80.5    0.3758 
    --    38   40.25    0.1258 
    Total    161   161    1.9938 
    +++    13   13.625    0.0287 
Three  Varietals  ++-    43   40.875    0.1105 
    +--    32   40.875    1.9270 
    ---    21   13.625    3.9920 
      Total      109    109               6.0582* 
    ++++      6   2.875    3.3967 
    +++-      7   11.5    1.7609 
Four  Varietals  ++--    10   17.25    3.0471 
    +---    18   11.5    3.6739 
    ----      5   2.875    1.5707 
      Total      46    46             13.4493* 
* Statistically significant at α = 0.05. Horowitz and Lockshin / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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With three varietals, two-thirds of the χ
2 = 6.0582 is attributable to 21 sellers with 
negative average residuals for all three of their varietals, as opposed to an expected 
13.625 observations under the independence hypothesis. With four varietals we only 
have an expected 2.872 observations in the two extreme cells. When those cells are 
combined with their immediate predecessors to form categories of at least three 
positive (negative) residuals, we again obtain a statistically significant χ
2 = 7.7536. 
Sixty percent of the latter value is contributed by the at-least-three-negatives 
category. In tandem, the three-varietal and four-varietal cases suggest that while 
there may be several sellers offering several varietals that as a matter of business 
policy and practice seek to offer their customers quality-bargains, many more of 
their counterparts do just the reverse.  
 
Too few sellers offered more than four varietals to permit similar tests, but an 
analogous grouping of their results provides some interesting insights. In five of the 
fourteen cases of a seller offering five varietals, there were three positive and two 
negative residual averages; the reverse holds in six of the cases. In the remaining 
three cases, four of the residual averages were negative. Once again, when more 
than two varietals are on offer, lower-than-expected quality tends to be the result.  
Nine sellers offered six varietals. Of those, two had three positive and three 
negative residual averages, two had two positive and four negative residual 
averages, four had five negative averages and one positive average, and one 
contrived to produce six negatives. Five wineries or groups offered seven varietals. 
One of these had five positives and two negatives, one had four positives and three 
negatives, two had two positives and five negatives, and one had one positive and 
six negatives. These results are also supportive of the general notion that when 
more than two varietals are on offer, lower-than-expected quality tends to be the 
result. The lone departure from the suggestion comes from the three sellers that 
offered all eight varietals. One of these producers had six positive and two negative 
residual averages, one had five positive and three negative residual averages, and 
the third had four and four. 
 
It would be erroneous to infer from the latter results a tendency for the larger 
sellers to bottle wine that will disappoint, given its price and other characteristics. 
First, any such inference relies on the erroneous presumption that only a large 
seller offers a broad array of products. Only one of the three sellers offering all eight 
varietals is in the Big Three and by contrast with the Hardy Wine Company and 
Foster’s Wine Estates, with wine-grape crushes of over 200,000 tons during our 
sample year, one of the three had a crush of less than 500 tons. Second, the larger 
sellers are unlikely to have achieved their large market shares by focusing solely on 
high-quality, higher-priced, single-grape wines that merit Halliday’s attention. And 
it would be equally erroneous to infer anything about the relationship of seller size 
and product quality from our results. 
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Doubtless many Australian producers can be relied on to offer higher-quality wines 
across the board than consumers have reason to expect, ceteris paribus, and 
doubtless others can be relied on to do just the reverse. The general implication of 
our results, however, is that product diversity is an especially fault-ridden signal as 
to the category, if either, into which any one producer falls. Several varietals from 
the same seller on a vintner’s shelf might want to give the potential buyer modest 
pause, as this diversity hints at giving buyers less than their money’s worth in any 
one bottle. In the overwhelming majority of instances, however, those in which a 
seller offers only one or two varietals, the lack of diversity provides not a shred of 




Economists have an unflappable belief in the disciplining force of the market. Yet, 
“you get what you pay for” remains a cliché that is regularly honored in the breech. 
Even as we write, some consumers are being pleasantly surprised by a bottle of 
wine because they think it’s a quality-bargain. Others, however, are suffering the 
less pleasant experience of feeling that the bottle isn’t worth the money. Even the 
repeat buyer is not immune. How often does one hear “This is not as good as I 
remembered it” or “This is better than I recalled”? A bottle of Australian wine could 
serve as an exemplar. 
 
Experience aside, consumers take their cues as to what to expect from a product of 
uncertain quality from its price, from the producer’s reputation, and from any 
number of other imperfect signals of product quality. A bottle of Australian wine 
could serve as an exemplar of such a product and one for which the practice is not 
entirely unjustified. Price and quality are indeed associated, and generally strongly 
so for Australian wine, but consumers will not necessarily get what they pay for. 
Sometimes they’ll get more and sometimes they’ll get less. The winery’s reputation 
also is a strong signal as to what to expect from the bottle, because that is how the 
winery got its reputation in the first place. Nevertheless, given its price, the 
winery’s reputation, and other specifics of the wine, the bottle might well exceed or 
fall short of the consumer’s expectations for it. 
 
Because sellers’ actions and the signals that they send can affect buyer behavior, 
sellers must consider how those acts and signals will be interpreted and the 
reactions they will engender. A decision to offer an array of wines, a merlot as well 
as a shiraz, whites as well as reds, sends a signal. How that signal will or should be 
interpreted are two different things. We have shown that one should not consider 
specialization to be a virtue when anticipating whether an Australian wine will 
surpass or fall short of price-and-label-based expectations. Indeed, the signal that a 
seller offers only one or two varietals provides no new information as to whether or 
not a quality-bargain is at hand. By the same token, while the diversity signaled by 
more than two varietals should not necessarily be considered a vice in the Horowitz and Lockshin / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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anticipation process, the evidence points that way. We refrain from speculating 
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